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Since 2003, South African policy discourse about persistent poverty has been 
dominated by the notion that poor people stay poor because they are 
trapped in a ‘second economy’, disconnected from the mainstream ‘First-
World economy’. This paper considers the adequacy of this notion in the 
light of research conducted in 2002 and 2005/06 in Mount Frere in the rural 
Eastern Cape, and in Cape Town’s African suburbs. It argues that a process of 
simultaneous monetisation, de-agrarianisation and de-industrialisation has 
created a heavy reliance on a formal sector in which employment is 
becoming increasingly elusive and fragile. Fieldwork suggested high levels of 
economic integration, corporate penetration and monetisation, even in the 
remote rural Eastern Cape. Rather than being structurally disconnected from 
the ‘formal economy’, formal and informal, ‘mainstream’ and marginal 
activities are often thoroughly interdependent, supplementing or subsidising 
one another in complex ways. The dynamics involved diverge significantly 
from those imagined both in ‘second economy’ discourse and in small, 
medium and micro enterprise (SMME) policy. Instead of imagining a separate 
economic realm, ‘structurally disconnected’ from the ‘first economy,’ it is 
more helpful to grasp that the South African economy is both unitary and 
heterogeneous, and that people’s prospects are determined by the specific 
ways in which their activities are caught up in the complex networks and 
circuits of social and economic power. Rather than ‘bringing people into’ the 
mainstream economy, policy-makers would do better to strengthen existing 
measures to reduce vulnerability, to consider ways of counteracting 
disadvantageous power relations within which people are caught, and to 
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Few notions in South African policy discourse have been simultaneously as 
influential and as undefined as the notion of the ‘second economy’. First 
introduced by President Thabo Mbeki in his now-famous August 2003 ‘Letter 
from the President’, the term has become central to the way that the causes 
of persistent poverty are conceptualised in public discourse in South Africa. 
Conferences are launched to ‘empower’, ‘develop’ or ‘bring information to’ 
the ‘second economy’; government websites speak authoritatively of its 
problems and its potential. At the other extreme, the Deputy President’s 
announcement of a new initiative for accelerating shared growth in South 
Africa identifies the need to ‘eliminate’ the ‘second economy’ (RSA 2006). 
However, precisely what is meant by this term – what constitutes the ‘second 
economy’, and what the characteristics are that make it ‘second’ – is 
generally not very clearly spelled out. How it is to be either ‘integrated’ into 
the ‘first economy’ or ‘eliminated’ is even less clear.  
 
In this paper, we engage with the ambiguous potential of ‘second economy’ 
talk by comparing its underlying assumptions with the findings of a period 
of research into the structured dynamics of persistent poverty in two South 
African contexts: a group of villages in the north-east of the former Transkei 
in the Eastern Cape; and two neighbourhoods in an African township on the 
periphery of greater Cape Town. In doing so, we are not taking official 
pronouncements about a ‘second economy’ literally. As officials have 
asserted, it is merely a metaphor. We argue, however, that metaphors 
matter; that, once assented to, they shape the kinds of questions researchers 
and policy-makers can ask. While the introduction of the idea of a ‘second 
economy’ constitutes an important shift in official discourse, we argue that it 
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is not a satisfying or adequate account of the real dynamics of economic 
marginalisation, and that, in fact, it perpetuates some problematic 
misapprehensions about the supposed relationships between ‘margins’ and 
the ‘centre’ in South Africa. Understanding these dynamics, we argue, 
requires a much more careful look at the actual ways in which particular 
people are caught up in the networks and circuits of a single internally 
differentiated and segmented economy. This reveals a very different picture 
and highlights issues that usually are disregarded. To search for the ‘second 
economy’, we argue, is to look for something that is not there – and to miss 
much of what is. 
 
Our argument here is part of a continuing theoretical exploration of the 
intellectual resources that are available for the work of understanding and 
exploring chronic poverty and inequality in South Africa and beyond. 
Although the problematic that we address is very much a South African one, 
rooted in local policy debates and realities, we believe it has international 
echoes: ‘second economy’ talk draws on habits of thought and unreflectively 
held assumptions that are more broadly shared within the discourses of 
development and globalisation, particularly those that relate to notions of 
‘social exclusion’ or to the links between global integration, growth, 
inequality and poverty. This paper, then, is intended to contribute to 
debates on the role of social exclusion and adverse incorporation in the 
perpetuation of chronic and structural poverty. Reflecting on the 
complexities of economic marginalisation in South Africa may cast valuable 
light on some of the more general features of the processes and problems 
focused on in the conceptual frameworks of adverse incorporation and 
social exclusion (for a more detailed discussion, see Hickey & Du Toit 2007).  
 
We begin with a brief account of the rise of ‘second economy’ talk and its 
reception. This is followed by a brief overview of the research project, the 
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findings of which this paper is based on, and a discussion of poverty, 
migrancy and adverse incorporation in the Eastern Cape and in Cape Town’s 
African townships. The paper next considers what these realities mean for 
informal sector activity and self-employment. We close by drawing several 
interpretive theoretical conclusions, and by highlighting some of the 
challenges facing pro-poor and social policy in South Africa. 
 
 
The rise of ‘second economy’ 
talk 
 
Some of the importance attached to the concept of the ‘second economy’ in 
South Africa, as articulated in policy discourses, is related undoubtedly to the 
manner and timing of its introduction. By 2003, it was becoming increasingly 
evident in South Africa that there were problems with the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, which had formed the 
cornerstone of South African government policies for macroeconomic 
stability, economic restructuring and growth. However successful GEAR had 
been in guiding fiscal policy, it had clearly failed as a job-creation and 
redistribution strategy (see, for example, Gelb 2006; Nattrass 1996). At the 
time, national surveys seemed to tell at best an ambiguous story about what 
was happening to poverty (Fedderke, Manga & Pirouz 2004); even the most 
optimistic analyses were suggesting that poverty had remained relatively 
constant, while others seemed to indicate that it had worsened (Meth & Dias 
2004; Hoogeveen & Özler 2005). The government’s nose had been put even 
further out of joint by an unexpectedly critical United Nations Development 
Programme report on South Africa (UNDP 2003). Policy debates about a 
variety of issues, from the fate of the Reconstruction and Development 
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Programme (RDP), to GEAR, to the Basic Income Grant (BIG), seemed to have 
reached an impasse, and tensions between conservative and radical elements 
were growing within the tripartite alliance of the governing African 
National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
 
In this context, President Mbeki’s intervention, in the form of a set of broad 
pronouncements outlined in his weekly party missive to the African National 
Congress, played an important role in reframing the terms of official 
thinking about growth, poverty, race and national identity. Hitherto, Mbeki 
had tended to describe poverty in South Africa exclusively as residual, as a 
legacy of apartheid and the policies of the past. While his interventions 
often showed a lively appreciation of the reality of deep inequality in South 
Africa, he had tended to portray it as an inequality between two nations  – 
language that framed the problem as essentially one of national 
reconciliation, not macroeconomic strategy (Faull 2005).  
 
The August 2003 ‘Letter from the President’ marked an important break. 
While it still bore the title ‘Bold steps to end the “two nations” divide’, it 
now depicted the key division in different terms: inequality and poverty 
were portrayed as the result of a ‘disjuncture’ within the structure of the 
economy itself. Perhaps borrowing from Allister Sparks’s (SARPN 2006) 
argument earlier that year that South Africa suffered from having a ‘double-
decker economy’,  he postulated the existence, ‘side by side with the modern 
“First World economy”’, of a ‘Third World economy’ that contained most of 
the poor people in the country. Crucially, Mbeki argued that ‘the 
interventions we make with regard to [the First World economy] do not 
necessarily impact on these areas, the “Third World economy”, in a 
beneficial manner’. Explicitly questioning predictions that the benefits of 
growth would ‘trickle down’ to poor people, he argued that ‘the reality is 
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that those who would be affected positively, as projected by these theories, 
would be those who…can be defined as already belonging to the “First 
World economy”’. What was needed, the letter argued, was interventions 
that could benefit those in the ‘Third World economy’ directly.  
 
This was not a radical about-turn, but it was a significant shift. It indicated a 
move away from the assumption that GEAR on its own could serve to 
eradicate poverty, and cleared the way for a much greater emphasis on the 
role of a ‘developmental state’ (Faull 2005). At the same time, there were 
ambiguities in the way that Mbeki framed these possibilities. Although the 
letter explicitly suggested the existence of a ‘structural disjuncture’ in the 
South African economy, it was very sketchy about the exact nature of this 
disjuncture. It referred concretely only to the fact that many unemployed 
people lacked the skills that would render them employable in the ‘First 
World economy’, and to the absence of appropriate forms of credit, a lack 
which supposedly delivers poor people into the hands of unscrupulous and 
extortionate money-lenders. Secondly, while the letter clearly acknowledged 
the possibility that poverty was not simply a disappearing legacy of the past 
but might be perpetuated by features of the post-transition order, the 
functioning of the ‘First World economy’ itself was not problematised. In 
fact, the ‘First World economy’ was still seen as the powerhouse that would 
generate the resources that could be used to benefit those in the ‘Third 
World economy’. The purpose of interventions directed at this laggard sector 
would still be to allow it to ‘outgrow its “Third World” nature’ and to 
‘become part of the “First World economy”’. In many ways, Mbeki’s analysis 
seemed reminiscent of very familiar – and largely discredited – dualist and 
liberal conceptions of the South African and other ‘developing’ economies 
(for an overview, see Potts 2007). 
 
In search of South Africa’s ‘second economy’ 
6 
 
Mbeki’s intervention was followed by other important policy documents. 
The Presidency’s Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Service’s Towards a Ten 
Year Review (PCAS 2005; see also ANC 2005) replicated Mbeki’s analysis in 
many ways, and appears to be the moment at which the term ‘second 
economy’ itself entered government discourse (those words, interestingly 
enough, not being used at all in Mbeki’s letter). After this, it swiftly became 
a key organising concept in government thinking about policy and 
implementation. As Jonathan Faull (2005: 9) points out, it is remarkable how 
in less than two years, reference to these notions ‘has become stump 
material for politicians, journalists, activists and academics alike and an 
integral component of contemporary political jargon’, key elements of a 
rhetoric that now informs ‘a substantive framework of policy and 
programme of action with tangible effects on the roll-out of services and 
societal interventions’.  
 
Although these shifts have been lauded as having helped to create more 
space for analysis and debate, the notion of the ‘second economy’ has met 
with a mixed reception. Among free-market liberals and businesspeople, the 
‘second economy’ was very quickly equated with the informal sector, and led 
to a focus not on Mbeki’s warnings about the failure of trickle-down effects, 
but on an essentially De Sotoan package of measures that would supposedly 
liberate the entrepreneurial potential waiting to be tapped in the informal 
sector (see, for example, CDE 2006). Towards the left of the political 
spectrum, Mbeki’s recognition of the limited impact of growth on poverty 
was welcomed, but the notion of the ‘second economy’ was decried as an 
intellectual sleight of hand directing attention away from how the normal 
workings of the capitalist mainstream economy helped produce poverty and 
unemployment (Frye 2007). Nonetheless, the notion has persisted. Even 
those who warned against simplistic or literal interpretations of the ‘second 
economy’ affirmed some of its key assumptions, and welcomed the ways in 
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which it allowed for the recognition of structural disjunctures created by the 
legacy of apartheid (Nzimande 2005; Baumann 2004; Aliber 2006). 
 
This is one of the more interesting aspects of ‘second economy’ discourse in 
policy debates. Perhaps its power and importance lies not in the literal 
accuracy of what it says about the South African economy – clearly the 
notion of the ‘second economy’ as an entirely separate economic realm with 
its own internal flows, boundaries and central institutions is rather easy to 
discount – but in its ability to provide a powerful and suggestive shorthand 
that can serve to name or frame the deeply segmented nature of South 
African society. As the South African Presidency’s Alan Hirsch has argued, the 
notion of the ‘second economy’ is simply a metaphor, a way of opening a 
debate on structural determinants of poverty in South African society (in 
Frye 2007: 176).  
 
Frye’s (2007: 176) response that ‘policies should not be built on metaphors’ 
seems to miss an important point: insofar as policies need to interpret, 
simplify and make sweeping sense of reality, they always rely on metaphor. 
A more searching response might be that one should never say simply a 
metaphor. Metaphors are lenses; they play a crucial role in organising the 
way the world is interpreted, and for that very reason always have 
consequences. While they may help us to grasp a complex reality in powerful 
and intuitive ways, they can also give rise to misunderstanding and can 
direct attention away from what matters. The question, therefore, is not 
only whether ‘second economy’ discourse offers an accurate analysis, but 
also what conceptual baggage and unstated assumptions it can import into 
analytical and policy discussions. 
 
One important effect of ‘second economy’ discourse, for instance, is that it 
sets up an elementary dichotomy between ‘integration’ and ‘disconnection’. 
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As one of us has argued elsewhere, proposing that the problem lies simply in 
exclusion leads almost inevitably to the unreflective and automatic 
assumption of the need for inclusion (Du Toit 2004; see also Hickey & Du Toit 
2007). Proponents of ‘second economy’ discourse do not deny that links exist 
between the economic mainstream and poor and marginalised people and 
regions; indeed, given the abundant evidence of a long history of 
incorporation and integration, they would be hard-pressed to do so. Rather, 
they seem to argue either that where disconnection exists, it is intrinsically 
disadvantageous; or that disadvantage, where it exists, must be due to some 
form of disconnection. So, although the existence of connections is not 
denied, ‘second economy’ discourse predisposes policy-makers to seek a 
‘better integration’ – which is almost universally understood do be a tighter, 
closer one – and leaves untouched the underlying assumption that this 
larger system into which people need to be integrated will necessarily 
function to their advantage. ‘Second economy’ discourse is not unique in this 
regard. These are broadly shared assumptions in many streams of 
development discourse. In sub-Saharan Africa, it is a crucial theme in 
interventions such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), which envisions the development of Africa through a programme 
of modernisation premised above all on the idea of ‘effectively managed 
integration’ into a globalising world (NEPAD 2001: 6). It is a core assumption 
in World Bank discourse about the relationship between globalisation, 
growth and poverty reduction (see Collier & Dollar 2001; DFID 2000); and it is 
a key element of right-wing revisionist defences of colonialism and 
neocolonialism (see, for example, McGreal 2007). 
 
Furthermore, the notion that poor people are poor because they are 
trapped in a parallel, structurally disconnected realm is linked to another 
important discourse about poverty, one that links poverty alleviation 
centrally to service delivery. As Bank, Kamman and Meyer (2006) have 
In search of South Africa’s ‘second economy’ 
9 
 
pointed out, this discourse approaches poor South Africans in the first place 
as passive citizen-consumers, constructs poverty essentially as a matter of 
inadequate delivery of social services and, thus, imagines poverty reduction 
to be essentially a matter of the delivery of these services, especially their 
roll-out to ‘deep rural’, ‘remote’, ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘lagging’ areas quite 
independently of whether these services can be used, are affordable or are 
even locally necessary.  
 
Thus, whether the notion of the ‘second economy’ is merely metaphorical is 
not the point. The issue is whether it is a helpful metaphor; whether the way 
in which it orients analysis and policy is useful or not. This is the challenge 
we seek to address in this paper. To what extent does the ‘two economies’ 
metaphor help us get a grip on the complex realities facing those who seem 
to have been unable to benefit in post-transition South Africa? Does it 
orient attention in a useful direction, and does it allow us to ask the right 
questions? If it is not a useful or appropriate way of thinking about the 
structural factors that keep poor people poor, what is? Interestingly enough, 
even critics of the ‘two economies’ discourse have not gone very far in trying 
to develop a detailed alternative account; although they have argued, like 
Nzimande (2005) and Frye (2007), that poverty and unemployment may be 
structural by-products of the normal operation of the mainstream economy, 
or that ‘first economy’ growth may exacerbate inequality (Gelb 2006), their 
attention too has been focused mostly on this mainstream. It seems, in fact, 
as if exclusion is assumed to be self-explanatory, as if not much of interest or 
worth knowing happens in that excluded, disconnected shadow-world. For 
all the currency of ‘second economy’ talk, the paradoxical fact is that in the 
national debates about poverty and ‘underdevelopment’ not much attention 
has been directed at exploring in detail the livelihoods of the marginalised 
poor themselves, the precise nature of their links with the mainstream 
In search of South Africa’s ‘second economy’ 
10 
 
economy, and what this means for their social and economic 
(dis)empowerment.  
 
Indeed, one of the interesting difficulties in engaging with ‘second 
economy’ discourse is that it is not always very clear exactly what the term 
actually denotes. As Devey, Skinner and Valodia (2006) have pointed out, it 
is not simply another name for the informal economy, because it clearly 
includes the involuntary and marginalised unemployed and some of those 
who are not economically active. But what is it then? The term seems to 
have a somewhat racialised logic – not merely because in South Africa it 
goes without saying that almost everyone ‘in’ the ‘second economy’ is black, 
but also because (like the notion of the ‘traditional sector’ in previous 
discourses about ‘developing’ economies) it is a way of naming those areas 
or formations of economic and social life that are understood to be different 
from, or other than, the ‘modern’ (i.e. Western-oriented and globally 
integrated) parts.1 Apart from that, it seems most of the time merely to be a 
residual term: the ‘second economy’ is defined negatively as consisting 
simply of those phenomena and activities that are not in the first economy. 
This means that ‘second economy’ discourse can have a distinctly circular 
aspect; it is used in causal explanations (poverty and marginalisation are the 
result of being ‘stuck in the second economy’) but, at the same time, any 
business or activity that does well and transcends survivalism (a better-off 
spaza, or informal shop, for instance, or a successful farm in the former 
homelands) would almost by definition be assumed no longer to be 
‘trapped’ in the ‘second economy’, and to have succeeded in becoming part 
of the ‘first economy’.  
 
                                            
1 As such, the notion of the ‘second economy’ has much in common with the way in which the 
notion of the ‘shadow’ economy works in Western discourse about ‘Africa’ (Ferguson 2006). 
In search of South Africa’s ‘second economy’ 
11 
 
This circularity brings a danger that the distinction has simply become 
tautologous: the notion of ‘second economy’ becomes reified as a kind of 
self-perpetuating, self-explanatory concept. As Henry Bernstein (1996) 
pointed out in an earlier and parallel discussion about the limits of 
functionalist and idealist approaches to economic analysis, it is necessary to 
discuss markets as they actually function, and not simply in terms of their 
deviation from a theoretical abstraction. A more productive approach might 
be to look carefully at the actual relationships and connections by which 
particular people and their activities are linked into the broader networks, 




Conceptualising structural and 
chronic poverty in South Africa 
 
It is to this challenge that the present paper responds. In the following 
pages, we consider some in-depth case studies drawn from a period of 
research in two key sites of impoverishment and economic marginalisation in 
South Africa (Du Toit & Neves 2006). Our analysis is not intended merely to 
disprove or to show up the weaknesses in the ‘second economy’ argument, 
but to suggest alternative ways in which economic marginality and structural 
disadvantage can be conceptualised.  
 
PLAAS’s research into the social dynamics of economic marginalisation is part 
of a broader concern with the political economy of chronic poverty and 
responses to it, and forms the subject matter of its partnership with the 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC), an international network of poverty 
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researchers centred in the UK. As has been pointed out elsewhere, 
understanding chronic poverty requires a careful analysis of structural 
poverty; this, in turn, cannot be reduced simply to the quantitative analysis 
of asset endowments, but should also involve a theorised exploration of how 
livelihoods are shaped and mediated by the broader political and social 
contexts within which they are pursued, and of the key role played by social 
processes and social relations (Du Toit 2005a, 2005b).  
 
These concerns have been investigated in two linked research projects 
exploring the livelihoods of some of South Africa’s marginalised poor. The 
first was an in-depth quantitative livelihood survey conducted in 2002, 
covering about 1 600 households in the export fruit growing town of Ceres, 
in Mount Frere district in the Eastern Cape, and in Cape Town’s African 
suburbs (Du Toit 2005a, 2005b; De Swardt et al. 2005). This was followed in 
2005/06 by an in-depth qualitative investigation of a smaller sample of 48 
households selected from the first and fifth income quintiles of the 2002 
survey. This study, conducted on behalf of the South African National 
Treasury, focused on the structured dynamics of vulnerability and social 
protection in Khayelitsha, Sites B and C, on the outskirts of greater Cape 
Town and in villages around Mount Frere.  Although these sites are 
geographically distinct, they represent two important nodes in the complex 
pathways built up by labour migrants between the Eastern and the Western 
Cape; research on both the Cape Town and the Eastern Cape ‘ends’ of these 
pathways allowed a detailed glimpse of rural-urban connections and 
dynamics in the context of post-apartheid migrant networks. In-depth 
interviews were held with ‘household heads’ and primary caregivers in each 
of these households. These interviews focused on exploring the wide range 
of often quite marginal economic activities on which people depended, as 
well as the key ways in which they were sustained by wider social networks. 
Ten of these households were selected for a second, more in-depth round of 
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case study investigations that looked in greater detail at key household 
members’ life histories, and that mapped broader social networks. In this 
round, research ‘snowballed’ from the case study households to include 
interviews not only with primary household members but also with the 
people in other households upon which they depended or that were 
dependent upon them. Research also focused on building up a clearer 
understanding of the ‘local political economies’ within which individuals and 
households made their choices and constituted their livelihoods (for a more 
detailed discussion of the project and its findings see Du Toit & Neves 2006). 
 
 
Adverse incorporation in the 
Eastern Cape  
 
Poverty and economic integration in South Africa’s remote 
centre 
 
We begin our analysis in the bleak hillsides around the town of Mount Frere 
in what these days is known as the ‘former Transkei’. The dry, un-irrigated 
grassland terrain and the stray livestock grazing perilously on the road 
verges make a clear contrast with the green fields, planted windbreaks, 
sturdy fences and scattered farmhouses on the KwaZulu-Natal side of the 
provincial border only a hundred or so kilometres away. Even the tarmac of 
the national road becomes frayed at the edges and punctuated by pot-holes 
in places. Mount Frere is a little more than midway between Mthatha and 
Kokstad, on the busy arterial route of the N2. The town is a commercial hub 
in the district, although the district municipality has its headquarters in 
nearby Mount Ayliff.  
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Research was conducted in the scattered villages of the Umzimvubu and 
Thabankulu areas in the Alfred Nzo District Municipality around Mount 
Frere. The villages are accessed by bumpy dirt roads that snake through the 
largely treeless landscape and often become impassable in the summer rains. 
The surrounding countryside everywhere bears the imprint of agriculture in 
decline, ranging from the overgrown terraces of abandoned ploughing 
fields (insimbi), the collapsed, rusting fences and the scrawny, listless 
livestock. The telltale green patches of cultivation that are visible are the 
garden plots that tightly encircle clusters of homesteads.  
 
This pastoral landscape is, at one and the same time, a neglected hinterland 
and a crossroads shaped by tight connections with other places. Buses, 
minibuses and the battered pickup trucks, known locally as quqas (beetles), 
carry a ceaseless stream of human traffic between the isolated villages, the 
local town of Mount Frere and more distant urban centres. The busy N2 
bisects the town, and freight-hauling juggernauts and cars rumble endlessly 
through. Present everywhere along the bustling main drag is the branding 
of corporate South Africa – Vodacom, Shoprite, Vicks, FNB, Cell C, Pep Stores, 
KFC, Castle Lager, Oxo and Boxer. Stalls line both sides of the main road, 
sometimes two deep, selling consumer goods, clothes, food and public 
cellphone access. The cosmopolitan make-up of this informal retail fringe 
gives the lie to the notion of Mount Frere as a far-flung rural outpost 
unconnected to the globalising world; business is conducted here by local 
people as well as Ghanaian, Senegalese, Zimbabwean, Chinese and Pakistani 
traders. Some of the latter (mostly peddling cellphone chargers and 
sunglasses) say they first left their native villages in Pakistan only six months 
earlier. On Fridays, pension payout days and month-ends, the town 
overflows with even more activity that usual, as the crowds spill out onto the 
streets. The passing traffic of lumbering trucks, sales reps in sedans, heavily 
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laden minibus taxis and holiday-makers in four-wheel-drive vehicles are 
compelled to pick their way carefully through the throng.  
 
Of course, none of this should be surprising. Even a cursory glance at South 
African history shows that ‘structural disconnection’ is a poor way of 
understanding the real relationship between the ‘former homelands’ and 
the mainstream economy. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rural 
Eastern Cape, a region that has been thoroughly shaped by centuries of 
forcible, differential and uneven integration and connection with other 
places and economies. We do not need more research to tell us this: several 
generations of anthropologists, historians and sociologists have traced, in 
detail, the complex ways in which colonial and apartheid policy worked to 
disrupt the agrarian economy of Xhosa society; how this helped make 
workers available to labour in the mines and factories of Johannesburg, East 
London and Cape Town; how policy aimed to subjugate and co-opt local 
elites and structures of traditional authority to serve the needs of settler 
society; how redundant workers were dumped back into the rural economy 
when the decline of mining and manufacturing meant that ‘unskilled’ and 
manual workers were no longer needed (Bundy 1988; Bank 2002; Bank & 
Minkley 2005; Southhall 1994). 
 
This history has created a very particular kind of landscape, one 
characterised by a profound lack of local economic activity and investment, 
and pervasive, historically sedimented relationships of dependency on other 
regions and economies. Here the persistence of poverty is driven by four 
interlocking dynamics:  
 
• Firstly, rural poverty has been exacerbated by decades of under-
investment in local infrastructure and agriculture, and by an uneven 
but significant process of de-agrarianisation (Bryceson 1996; Bryceson 
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& Jamal 1997). Bank et al. (2006) show how in the former homeland 
areas the slow collapse of agrarian production has led to a high 
degree of intra-regional migrancy; as the restrictions on ‘squatting’ 
enforced by the apartheid and homeland regimes were lifted, large 
numbers of people abandoned the more remote villages and settled 
around secondary towns.  
 
• Secondly, the mining and manufacturing industries of the Highveld 
that sustained generations of unaccompanied male circular migration 
(and that enabled some investment in cattle and local agrarian 
capacity) no longer require vast numbers of unskilled, cheap black 
labourers. Surveys seem to indicate that remittances are dwindling 
and that migration to urban centres is becoming less certain and more 
risky (Binns & Nel 2003; Bank et al. 2006).  
 
• Thirdly, de-agrarianisation, local urbanisation and the repatriation of 
surplus workers have not led to the greater development of local 
service delivery. Local services and industry are strikingly thin and 
limited to a few, often overtraded sectors predominantly in retail and 
low-end services. A process of internal migration and ‘rural 
densification’ as people moved from more remote to more strategic 
and better serviced locations has led to the development of dense 
settlements of rural poor around smaller Eastern Cape towns such as 
Peddie, Cala and Butterworth However, with jobs being scarce, with 
migrants neither finding jobs nor being able to migrate onwards to 
the larger urban centres, these small towns have become local poverty 
traps with residents limited to circular migration between small towns 
and rural social networks (Bank et al. 2006).  
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• Fourthly, the growing HIV/AIDS pandemic is felt amongst the 
working-age population of the province, leaving children and elders 
to cope with the demands of survival and the escalating care burden 
of looking after orphans and dying relatives (Marks 2002), raising the 
spectre of ‘involution’, where ‘the poor reinvent communitarian 
traditions of mutual dependence and risk-spreading in an effort to 
protect themselves from the effects of deepening poverty’ and 
become locked into mounting poverty (Bank & Minkley 2005: 26).  
 
Clearly – and most proponents of the ‘second economy’ thesis would 
presumably not deny this – the society and economy of the rural Eastern 
Cape cannot be characterised simply in terms of inclusion and disconnection. 
Rather, we submit that the rural Eastern Cape should be seen as a case of 
what has elsewhere been called ‘adverse’ or dependent incorporation 
(Murray 2001; Bracking 2003; Du Toit 2004). The research and analytical 
challenge is to develop a better understanding of the nature of this adverse 
incorporation, and to look at the exact ways in which connections to the 
urban metropoles shape livelihoods either positively or negatively.  
 
 
De-agrarianisation and social 
change 
 
In-depth interviews with a small number of selected households cannot offer 
up a detailed or comprehensive analysis of an entire region and all of its 
overarching social and economic dynamics. Case studies, however, can cast 
light on some of the key livelihood processes at work, highlight 
interconnections and links between apparently disparate processes, and 
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suggest the ways in which these processes are shaped by modes of 
incorporation into the broader South African and global economy. An 
exploration of what is revealed by an investigation of dynamics at the level 
of individual histories, along with inter- and intra-household dynamics, can 
illustrate much about how these elements are shaped by circuits of 
interconnection to distant systems, places, markets and economies. 
 
One important dynamic illuminated by this work is the complex role played 
by agriculture and the intricate social and economic dynamics of de-
agrarianisation. The limited role of agriculture is a clear contributing factor 
to poverty in the Mount Frere region. In the 2002 PLAAS/CPRC survey, less 
than 2% of households were able to subsist on their own maize crop for ten 
months in the year; while 87% of households were reliant on store-bought 
maize meal all year round. Clearly, the historical neglect of black and 
smallholder farming by the apartheid government, and decades of 
systematic under-investment in infrastructure and support services play an 
important role here. Agriculture and various land-based activities continued 
to play an important role in household well-being, yet households were 
variable in the extent to which they could participate in and benefit from it. 
Significant investment in land-based activities was usually the prerogative of 
wealthier households that had money to pay for inputs such as ploughing 
and the acquisition of livestock. In the 2002 survey, households that reported 
harvesting six to ten 50 kg bags of maize in the previous year, also reported 
an income of R200 per adult-equivalent in the household, whereas 
households that did not cultivate maize reported an income of R153 per 
adult equivalent. Households that cultivated maize contained 50% more 
adults holding down permanent jobs than those that did not. The same 
pattern emerged in the 2005 qualitative investigation. In the Eastern Cape 
qualitative study, six out of the 24 households visited showed significant 
investment in and benefit from agricultural activity, and each one of these 
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six households was a significantly better-off, pluri-active homestead, where 
agricultural activity was supplemented and enabled by income or savings 
from formal sources.  
 
So, in one sense, households clearly do profit from ‘connection’ with the 
urban and formal economy, in that those who have access to sources of 
formal income are better able to participate in agriculture. This is only part 
of the story, however. More to the point, this pattern cannot be taken as 
evidence that the region’s ills stem from disconnection, and that closer 
integration into the market economy is the answer. Rather, this pattern 
relates to an underlying social and economic process that has shaped the 
possibilities open to both households that had strong connections with the 
urban economy and those that did not. Both the ability of some households 
to participate effectively in agriculture, and the difficulties faced by those 
that cannot, are the outcome of a broader and more complex market-
related restructuring of the local agrarian economy.  
 
One key dynamic here is related to the deepening of monetisation. Within 
the focal research area, there were strong indications that the role of 
agriculture has declined in the district. With many of the large cultivated 
fields (intsimi) falling into disuse, householder agriculture had retreated to 
the garden plots adjacent to homesteads. Evidence from elsewhere in the 
former Transkei suggests an ‘intensification’ in the cultivation of the smaller 
homestead garden plots, in an effort to maintain output in the face of 
declining resources (Andrews & Fox 2004). In the 2005/06 research, 
informants readily related the abandonment of the cultivated fields to the 
fact that ploughing increasingly relies on mechanical rather than animal 
traction. Poorer householders have neither the money required to hire 
tractors to plough, nor the access to animal traction. This is possibly in part 
due to changes in the nature of cattle ownership. Some research suggests 
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that while overall numbers of livestock in the rural Eastern Cape have 
remained more or less constant, cattle ownership has become highly 
concentrated (Heron 1991). Indeed, PLAAS’s 2002 survey suggested a very 
unequal distribution of cattle: while 80% of households owned less than five 
head of cattle, about half owned none, and 5% owned ten head of cattle or 
more (Du Toit & Neves 2006). Moreover, cattle ownership is frequently 
correlated with non-rural income sources, and tends to be concentrated in 
the hands of local elites such as traditional leaders, bureaucrats and 
businessmen (Cousins 1996). So, while there is a sense in which the ability of 
a household to participate in agriculture is a function of being better 
connected than households excluded from access to formal employment or 
regular income, it does not follow that ‘tighter integration’ of this region 
into the market economy is what is required. Rather, both the ability (of 
some) and the inability (of many) to participate effectively in agriculture are 
part of a broader dynamic of deepening local inequality. 
 
Moreover, de-agrarianisation is not merely a direct outcome of the local 
economics of ploughing. It seems also to be linked to the complex re-
articulation of the social relations that sustained a particular kind of local 
agriculture in the past. For one thing, the abandonment of the planting 
fields unchains a further local social dynamic. With fewer people cultivating, 
there is little incentive for the entire village to keep stray animals out of the 
poorly fenced fields. With the introduction of schooling and changing intra-
household relations of power, children are less available to control livestock. 
Consequently, many respondents reported crop losses due to stray livestock, 
or expressed a reluctance to cultivate in anticipation of these losses. In 
addition, interviewees reported a process that might be called ‘bovine 
deskilling’ – even where people have livestock, oxen are no longer being 
trained to plough, further increasing people’s dependency on mechanical 
traction. The decline of agriculture in this region is further compounded by 
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the dissipation of whatever homeland-era agricultural extension services 
(such as cattle dipping) existed in the past. 
 
Furthermore, deepening rural inequality has its own consequences for the 
social arrangements that used to sustain local agriculture. Sharper economic 
differentiation between households undermines co-operative work 
arrangements, such as the ilima (work parties constituted for weeding fields) 
and the collective ploughing companies that traditionally were a mainstay of 
agricultural labour. Better-resourced households are inclined to withdraw 
from these groupings when they receive fewer benefits than they 
contribute; hence, poorer households are further undermined in their ability 
to engage in agrarian production (Spiegel & Mehlwana 1997).  
 
Therefore, de-agrarianisation is not merely a process that can be understood 
in terms of the economics of cattle husbandry, agrarian cultivation and 
communal labour. It is also connected to the intricate links people make 
‘between food production, rural life and social identity’ (Bank & Minkley 
2005: 27). Successful agrarian production and the co-operative work 
arrangements embodied in the ilima depended on a certain articulation of 
social and gender relations within and between households, and on an 
underlying set of social and moral precepts – a conservative, patriarchal, 
rural cultural ideology that enforced a collective commitment to an agrarian, 
Xhosa way of being. While these social forms can still flourish in some maize-
growing districts in the former Transkei, areas characterised, interestingly, 
not merely by a location in the high rainfall coastal belt, but also by 
remoteness and lack of disruption by markets (McAllister 2001), changes in 
large parts of the Eastern Cape have served to undermine the social relations 
and gendered power relations that underpinned the extraction of labour 
from women and children (Ngwane 2003; Bank 2005). This interplay 
between social identity and agrarian production is even evident in the 
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changing nature of the household formation. In the past, migrant labour in 
South Africa’s mining and manufacturing centres enabled young men to pay 
dowry (lobola) and thereby ‘build’ the homesteads (in both social and 
economic terms). The resultant normative cycle of household development 
rendered agricultural work the preserve of either middle-aged men, who 
had retired from urban labour, or women (Spiegel 1996). There is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that local agrarian labour continues to be regarded as 
an inappropriate vocation for a young man.  
 
Finally, at this point, it is useful to think of the place of agriculture in 
relation to larger debates concerning the dynamics of economic 
marginalisation. The smallholder agriculture described above does not fit 
neatly into either the ‘second economy’ or the ‘first economy’ as they are 
conceptualised conventionally. Agrarian production around Mount Frere is 
far from an autochthonous, traditionalist activity, untouched by modernity 
and engaged in by those who are not part of the first economy; on the 
contrary, it depends crucially on access to cash provided by formal 
employment or (at the very least) cash transfers. Yet, neither does 
agriculture, where it is productive, succeed only because it is thoroughly 
integrated and oriented towards the market economy. Even in the 
wealthiest and most agriculturally productive households, farming generally 
plays an economically supplementary role. It makes sense, and succeeds, as 
part of the complex, mutually interlocking portfolio of livelihood activities 
and practices of reciprocal exchange that characterise pluri-active rural 
livelihoods in the Eastern Cape more generally.  
 
These reflections highlight the complex place of agriculture in local 
livelihood systems, and significantly complicate the notion that Mount 
Frere’s agrarian economy suffers simply from its disconnection with the 
economic mainstream. Rather, they suggest that the path of integration 
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with the broader South African economy has created a dynamic where some 
(those who have managed to hold on to scarce formal sector employment, 
or to eke out a living on remittances and savings) have been able to benefit 
from agricultural involvement, while monetisation, deepening inequality 
and the re-articulation of the social arrangements that enabled land-based 




Industrial decline and retail penetration 
 
If a relative dearth of agricultural activity is a feature of the Mount Frere 
district, a further striking feature of the region is the absence of a thriving 
secondary economic sector (particularly manufacturing or industry). Not only 
has South African mining and manufacturing employment declined, the 
Eastern Cape’s textile and garment industries, created as part of the 
apartheid policy of ‘deconcentration’, have collapsed (Nel & Temple 1992; 
Bank & Minkley 2005). By 1998, Butterworth alone had lost 80% of its 
industrial jobs, each supporting scores of rural dependants (Bank & Minkley 
2005). The forces of economic change, market liberalisation and 
globalisation, therefore, confer the overarching context and represent some 
of the factors driving the decline of both agrarian and industrial activity in 
this region, and much of sub-Saharan African generally.  
 
Moreover, there are linkages and synergies between these two sectors; for 
instance, the Asian development literature is replete with accounts of rural 
industry. Livelihood diversification (through non-farm employment, petty 
commerce and urban migration) now contributes to roughly half of all rural 
incomes in low-income countries (Ellis & Allison 2004). This diversification, 
however, serves to reproduce and reinforce the social differentiation 
described above. While better-off households usually diversify into non-farm 
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economic activities (such as business, transport services and construction), 
the rural poor, with fewer opportunities, engage in casual work, much of it 
in agriculture and subject to the same shocks and seasonality of smallholder 
agrarian production (Ellis 2006).  
 
The general paucity of the secondary economic sector in this region is 
arguably related not to the lack of linkages with the formal economy, but to 
its very nature and ubiquity. Systematically deprived of development for 
decades, the sudden retail deregulation of the former Transkei in the 1990s 
saw the local retail economy rapidly dominated by large national 
supermarket chains, which swiftly moved into the small rural service centres 
such as Mount Frere. While these supermarkets have succeeded in supplying 
local areas with cheaper food, they have also been part of a far-reaching 
transfiguration of the rural economy. Crucially, they have undermined the 
economic base of the network of rural trading stores that in many ways 
constituted local hubs in the region’s agrarian economy. Although these 
stores enjoyed a statutory protection from competition that saw their white 
traders, and later the homeland elite, benefiting from a captive market, they 
were also important centres of local exchange. Rural trading stores were 
where migrant labours took ‘the join’ (labour recruitment); stores milled 
local farmers’ maize, bought and sold local agricultural surpluses, and were 
hubs of postal and telephonic communication. The local credit economy on 
which these stores depended has made way for a cash economy in which 
supermarkets are central. These stores are in part what give Mount Frere its 
centrality in the district; its limited importance as a centre of local 
government is of far less significance that the five large wholesalers and 
supermarkets it is home to. Three national supermarket chains (Shoprite, 
Spar and Boxer, a subsidiary of the Pick n Pay group) have shop frontage 
within a few hundred metres of each other on the town’s main road.  
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Although these supermarket chains offer cheaper food, their supply lines 
invariably bypass local production. Milk, meat and other perishables for sale 
in Mount Frere supermarkets are sourced not from local producers, but from 
the more distant commodity markets of Kokstad, Durban and East London. 
Of the five largest retailers in Mount Frere, only a single supermarket is in 
any sense locally owned (by a long-resident white family). Only they are 
willing (and able to) purchase products locally. The store’s enterprising 
owner turns his local expertise and decentralised management into a 
competitive advantage; surplus or bruised fruit and vegetables are peddled 
directly on the pavement. Thus, this store (a franchise of a major global 
supermarket chain, with 14 500 stores in 33 countries) competes head-to-
head with the informal vendors on the dusty sidewalks of Mount Frere.  
 
Of course, these patterns are continuous with the economic circuits long 
established through the dependent incorporation of the Eastern Cape as a 
supplier of migrant labour. Perhaps nothing speaks as eloquently of the way 
in which migrant labour has inserted the region into the national economy 
than the material geography and institutional underpinnings of the town’s 
cash economy. In less than a kilometre of main street, there are three 
automated teller machines (ATMs); and the way they are positioned says 
much about cash flows in the local economy. Each one is positioned in close 
proximity to one of the three major supermarkets: the Standard Bank ATM is 
in a new face-brick edifice across the road from the local Spar, Mount Frere’s 
oldest supermarket. The ABSA ATM is grafted onto the side of a steel 
shipping container, on the pavement alongside the local Shoprite. One of 
the FNB machines illustrates the symbiosis between retail banking and food 
retail even more dramatically. A compact device no larger than a modest 
television set, it sits within the lobby of the local Boxer supermarket, and 
contains no money; instead, the machine dispenses printed slips that can be 
redeemed for cash or goods from the store cashiers, thereby eliminating the 
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need for superfluous duplication of the cash infrastructure. A similar 
arrangement exists in respect of the pension pay-out machine situated inside 
the local Spar: this machine bears a handwritten sign indicating that 
pensions can be drawn there, on condition that drawees immediately spend 
10% of their payout in the shop.  
 
Follow the money, as the saying goes: cash comes into Mount Frere in 
armoured transit vans, is deposited into the ATMs and is drawn by local 
people (often against funds deposited by distant relatives or drawn down as 
social grants); it typically moves five or ten metres across the street or lobby 
of a store, and then leaves again, repatriated as profits to South Africa’s 
retail giants. Mount Frere is neither a local economic hub nor a neglected, 
economically irrelevant hinterland; rather, it is a small node in a larger 
network. Although the links into the national and mainstream economy 
appear direct and strong, what is lacking is a network of internal 
interconnections and meaningful local multipliers to constitute a functioning 
local economy.  
 
 
The political economy of race 
and space in greater Cape Town 
 
While poverty in Mount Frere is shaped by the key facts of remoteness, 
underdevelopment, de-agrarianisation and adverse incorporation, poverty in 
the African township of Khayelitsha seems to be patterned most by the 
political economy of racialised urban space. Established in the mid-1980s in 
the context of fierce resistance to removals from other informal settlements 
(Cook 1985), Khayelitsha is inhabited mostly by recent migrants to Cape 
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Town. From this perspective, perhaps the most salient fact about Khayelitsha 
is that while it is populated largely by those who have left the rural Eastern 
Cape to seek jobs in Cape Town, it remains in a very large measure 
economically, spatially and racially marginalised from the city.  
 
In the first place, the urban economy has not succeeded in creating many 
formal employment opportunities for Cape Town’s impoverished, landless 
and under-educated African population. Since the early 1980s, increasing 
capital intensity in the economy as a whole has driven a decline in 
manufacturing employment, with 200 000 jobs being lost between 1980 and 
1996 nationally. While Cape Town initially bucked this trend, the period 
after 1996 saw significant manufacturing job losses, driven mostly by the 
decline in the clothing industry (see Table 2). In addition, there has been a 
decline in the number of people employed in private households (SACN 
2004). On the whole, then, employment opportunities for unskilled workers 
have been diminishing.  
 
This is unlikely to be addressed in the future by the growth path taken by 
the city. Like many other South African cities, Cape Town has emphasised an 
outward-looking, globally integrated growth path, emphasising financial 
services, tourism and export-led manufacturing (SACN 2004). It is important 
to note that this phenomenon goes much deeper than the ‘structural 
disconnection’ identified by President Mbeki, whose formulations imply that 
there would be jobs for the unemployed if they possessed the necessary 
skills. As Banerjee et al. (2006) argue, employment in South Africa is 
presently very near equilibrium; although there is a ‘skills gap’, the shortfall 
in skilled workers is much smaller than the number of unemployed.  
 
Even where ‘unskilled’ jobs do become available, cultural, racial and 
linguistic factors continue to marginalise Khayelitsha’s residents. Half of the 
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urban respondents in the 2002 survey reported that they were unable to 
speak either Afrikaans or English, a figure that was relatively independent of 
whether they were recent immigrants or not; even among those who had 
had between and 11 and 12 years of schooling, 28% reported themselves 
unable to speak Afrikaans or English (see Table 1). This is a substantial 
disadvantage, given that Cape Town is the only South African metropolitan 
area with a majority non-African population (Cousins, Parnell & Skuse 2005). 
While unemployment in Cape Town is lower than in many other South 
African cities, estimates still put the rate (in the expanded definition) at 
between 25% and 30% of the labour force (SACN 2004) (see Table 3). Within 
this general statistic, African migrants are disproportionately represented. 
While they constitute the single largest group of migrants to Cape Town 
(54% of the city’s immigrant population), they are also the most 
marginalised grouping; while the migratory flow of work-seekers from the 
Eastern Cape dwarfs all others into Cape Town, migrants from the Eastern 
Cape are among the most likely to face unemployment, and on average 
report lower incomes than other migrants (Cousins, Parnell & Skuse 2005). 
Naidoo, Leibbrandt and Dorrington (2007) report that 29% of migrants from 
the Eastern Cape to Cape Town in the five years before the 1996 Census 
were unemployed at the time of that census; this figure worsened to 38% by 
the time of the 2002 survey. The 2002 CPRC survey did not ask questions that 
allow an estimation of unemployment according to either the broad or 
narrow definition, but it did record that in the 625 households that were 
visited in Cape Town’s African suburbs, some 63% of the 1 619 adults of non-
pensionable age had ‘no paid work’, and 51% percent of those adults 
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Table 1: Percentage of adults in Cape Town sample reportedly unable to speak either 
Afrikaans or English (n = 1 660)  
 
 
Source: PLAAS/CPRC household livelihoods survey, 2002 
 
 
Table 2: Change in percentage sectoral contribution to GGP in Cape Town - 1994 to 2005 







 Agriculture 5.86 
 Transport 3.12 
 Business services 3.07 
 Wholesale & retail trade 2.48 
 Construction -0.02 
 Community social services -0.04 
 Electricity & water -0.12 
 Mining -0.46 
 Government -3.83 











Total sample  49.7 
Adult male 52.3 
Adult female 47.8 
At address for less than a year 48.2 
At address for more than 5 years 50.4 
With no schooling 90.0 
With up to 7 years of schooling 67.5 
With 11–12 years of schooling 28.7 
In search of South Africa’s ‘second economy’ 
30 
 
Table 3: Cape Town Employment Status: Age 15-64: Totals by Race Group and Gender: 2004 
(From Cousins Parnell & Skuse 2005) 
 
 
 Black  
 male 

















 78 000  91 607  51 445  46 122  4 400  2 906 
 
 Not economically  
 active 
 
 119 434  170 049  137 493  239 888  43 176  75 979 
 
 
The social disadvantage many Eastern Cape migrants face when competing 
in Cape Town’s labour markets is exacerbated by the politics of race and 
space. In an important sense, Khayelitsha is in, but not of, Cape Town. It is 
situated more than 30 kilometres from the city centre and is remote from 
the shopping and manufacturing sectors where most of the jobs are to be 
found. Travel to and from these centres is expensive, time-consuming and 
unsafe. In many ways, then, Khayelitsha is something of an economic, racial 
and cultural enclave. People travel over a thousand kilometres from the 
Eastern Cape to come to the urban areas – and, indeed, shuttle back and 
forth between their rural homesteads and their dwellings in Sites B, C or 
Kuyasa – but rarely venture the last 15 or 30 kilometres into the economic 
hub. Thus, economically, culturally and socially, Khayelitsha is a paradoxical 
place. Thoroughly metropolitan and part of the urban economy, it is also in 
some ways the Eastern Cape’s westernmost village. Although perched right 
on the urban perimeter of greater Cape Town, its inhabitants often speak as 
if Encobo is closer than Claremont, and visit Qumbu more often than they do 
Kraaifontein. Created as an apartheid dormitory township, Khayelitsha has 
acquired a community character in its own right; while characterised by high 
levels of poverty and unemployment, it is also humming with informal 
activity.  




Does Khayelitsha, then, constitute a ‘second economy’ disconnected from 
the urban economy of the rest of the city? The notion does not seem 
appropriate. Although we have said that Khayelitsha is ‘in’ but not ‘of’ 
greater Cape Town, both sides of that paradox – its connections with urban 
economic life and its spatial separation (originally conceived through 
apartheid spatial planning, now perpetuated through the calculus of land 
values and practices of urban planning) – are parts of the overarching 
political logic of the township’s racially differentiated spatial and social 
incorporation into Cape Town. Khayelitsha’s residents are (largely) 
redundant as unskilled workers, yet they are valued as consumers; they are 
isolated from the city’s economic epicentre, yet are decisively present as 
citizens and voters; they are constructed through a racialised discourse of 
crime and fear as a potential threat to Cape Town’s lucrative tourist industry, 
yet they are themselves objects of tourism. Khayelitsha, like many other 
South African ghettoes, now boasts carefully managed township tours. 
There is even a tourist panopticon: a lookout point on a hillock at the edge 
of the township, from which visitors can peer out at the matchbox houses 
and ramshackle dwellings that stretch out below.  
 
Grunebaum-Ralph and Henry (2003) have described in powerful terms the 
continuities between the city’s apartheid past and the ways in which its 
present-day racial geography continues to be reaffirmed and reasserted 
through the shoring up of economic privilege: 
 
Cape Town is a city that continues to be shredded by the 
complexities of division and violence. The violence of the city, of 
its extremes of wealth and poverty and the irreconcilable realities 
that exist inside of these extremes, mark everyone each day in 
ways that are not always clear, conscious or visible. It feels like a 
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city that is ready to burst with the violent force of the irrepressible 
realness of its history. Mostly everything remains color-coded 
according to previous Apartheid ‘race’ categories. This is visible in 
every sphere of society from who works in restaurant kitchens and 
who owns them; who cleans the roads and sidewalks and who are 
shop owners, whose children are cared for by nannies and whose 
children have to fend for themselves. The spatial boundaries of 
Cape Town remain distinct, obliterating even the memory of how 
these spaces were manipulated into existence through Apartheid 
laws of forced removals and group areas…In the townships of the 
Cape Flats, the highly differentiated and segregationist 
topography that is inscribed by roads, highways, footpaths, 
intersections, railway lines, cooling towers, industrial zones and 
open fields become naturalized as the visible boundaries and 
invisible thresholds marking structural poverty and the 
internalization of hopelessness. In this way the structural 
relationship between township demography, socio-economic 
deprivation, and the stark extremes of socio-economic realities 
between the city center and the marginalized townships are 
delinked. Colonial and Apartheid social, spatial and economic 
engineering that created ‘race’ categories and defined human 
existence and citizenship along scales of legal, illegal, native, 
migrant, citizen, and subject have been dismantled legally. Yet 
each day, the public transport system runs a service schedule 
whose function is solely to transport hundreds of thousands of 
workers from township economies of servitude, 
‘underdevelopment’, and abjection, to the economic center to eke 
out a subsistence living in ways that rehearse daily the enforced 
journeys of land dispossession, displacement, destruction of 
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families, dispersion of communities, and resettlement. 
(Grunebaum-Raph & Henry 2003) 
 
For Grunebaum-Ralph and Henry, the distinction that matters is not 
between those in the townships who are (‘still’) disconnected and excluded 
from the ‘first economy’ and those (the entrepreneurs, the skilled and those 
with access to micro-credit) who have entry to its opportunities. Rather, it 
exists in the overarching racialised and spatially enforced political geography 
of the city as a whole: a geography that assigns both the elite and the 
impoverished, both the labouring poor and the unwanted and unemployed, 
to their places in the city’s spatial and economic order. Their rendition is 
arguably a little overstated – as we shall argue below, there is a need for a 
more differentiated vision of the opportunities and the limits on agency 
within the city’s economic margin – but their reminder of the structural 
violence of apartheid, and the perpetuation of that structural violence by 
the routines of ‘normal’ life in post-apartheid South Africa provides a 
powerful counter to the rather pallid notion that all that keeps poor people 
poor is that they somehow have not yet found a way of being part of this 
new order in the first place. 
 
Together, these factors – accumulated social and educational disadvantage, 
the perpetuation of spatial and racial segregation, an internecine local 
politics of linguistic and cultural exclusion, and estrangement from many of 
the circuits of economic prosperity and accumulation – have important 
consequences for what in development-speak would be called the 
‘vulnerability context’ of Khayelitsha’s residents: 
 
• The first key factor is the simultaneous centrality and fragility of paid 
employment in or on the margins of the formal sector. In the 2002 
survey, more than half of the upper income decile of the households 
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in Cape Town’s African suburbs contained at least one adult with 
access to either a pension or permanent, stable employment. 
However, the data also highlight the insecurity of employment in the 
usually unskilled sectors of the economy: 31% of 622 urban households 
reported in 2002 that the breadwinner had suffered the loss of work 
in the previous year, and 30% reported the loss of a permanent job in 
the previous five years. Even formal employment is tenuous. 
 
• Secondly, as with the urban poor elsewhere in the world, urbanisation 
and integration into the urban economy is a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, closeness to the urban sector assures greater chances of 
employment and a better income; in Cape Town, unemployment is 
significantly lower than the national rate outside cities (Boraine et al. 
2006). On the other hand, the local economy is far more thoroughly 
monetised, and there is no agrarian economy to potentially cushion 
monetary shortfalls. This is an important point to be borne in mind by 
those who dismiss the role of so-called ‘subsistence’ agriculture in the 
Eastern Cape. While the 2002 survey households appeared monetarily 
much better off than those in Mount Frere (mean expenditure per 
adult in the urban sample was R250, as opposed to R160 in the rural 
areas), the proportion of households that reported devoting more 
than 40% of household expenditure to food was almost the same (Du 
Toit & Neves 2006). While cash is more plentiful, the effects of cash 
shortfalls are more dire, and while closer integration into the urban 
economy brings increased opportunities, it also means that urban 
livelihoods are more sensitive to fluctuations and changes in that 
economy.2 
 
                                            
2 This parallels the experience of the urban poor elsewhere in the world; in Latin America, for 
instance, the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth is significantly higher in the urban than in 
the rural areas (see, for example, Faye 2005). 
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• This increased vulnerability to fluctuations in the formal economy is 
made even more significant by the limited scope for informal 
economic activity that can cushion these shocks and supplement 
formal sector income. So although qualitative research was able to 
reveal much broader participation in informal economic activity than 
the 2002 survey suggested, these activities have to be undertaken 
under very difficult circumstances. The distances to the town centres 
mean that residents are far from not only formal jobs but also markets 
for informal economic activity. Unemployed African migrants in 
Khayelitsha trying to make a living from informal economic activities 
are pinned down in the poorest parts of Cape Town.  
 
• As in the Eastern Cape, another problem is the fact that some of the 
linkages that do exist between the township economy and the formal 
economy are problematic. A key issue here is the central and 
dominating role of large supermarket chains, which necessarily crowd 
out informal retail activity. Again, it is not clear whether, in the 
context of economic vulnerability and fragile employment, the 
economic benefits of cheaper food outweigh the lost opportunities 
for self-employment. It is, however, clear that one of the key 
asymmetries facing those involved in informal sector activity is that 
while households in poorer communities are denied access to markets 
in the wealthy, white parts of town, the leading corporations of the 
so-called ‘first economy’ have untrammelled access to township 
markets. This must significantly reduce the potential for local 
multipliers. 
 
• Another important factor limiting and constraining informal economic 
activity flows from the character of social relations in Khayelitsha. For 
a variety of reasons, extreme poverty and deprivation, a population of 
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relatively recent and transient migrants, crime and violence and fear 
thereof, and the historical lack of effective policing on the Cape Flats 
are central facts of life in Khayelitsha. Current research indicates that 
fear of crime and criminality may play an important inhibiting role in 
plans for informal economic activity (Cichello 2005). In more than one 
case, informants corroborated this, indicating that crime, violence and 









In the previous pages we have sketched some key issues that are often left 
aside in mainstream analyses of poverty – analyses that concentrate on the 
supposed characteristics of poor ‘households’ and individuals, without 
considering the local contexts that shape the ways they can use their assets 
and that mediate the impacts of shocks and change (Murray 2001). We have 
argued that, at least in the two contexts we have sketched, many of the 
obstacles in the way of poor people stem not merely from disconnection, but 
from the complex nature of their relationship with the ‘mainstream’ 
economy. Far from being unintegrated, they are often thoroughly 
integrated, but in ways that undermine their ability to constitute themselves 
powerfully as economic actors and social agents. What does this hostile and 
difficult terrain mean for the ways in which people do seek to make a 
livelihood? In this section we consider some of the characteristics of 
In search of South Africa’s ‘second economy’ 
37 
 
‘informal’ or ‘self-employment’ activity in both the rural Eastern Cape and 
Khayelitsha.  
 
By way of introduction, three key observations can be made on what in-
depth research has revealed about self-employment and informal economic 
activity. Firstly, informal economic activity and self-employment seem to be 
somewhat more prevalent than suggested in the 2002 study. A walk through 
any of the densely populated shack settlements in the older, longest-settled 
sections of Khayelitsha Site C gives the visitor the impression that there is 
hardly a household that is not involved in some kind of low-level and 
informal economic activity, whether it is selling packets of chips or cold 
drinks, making and selling umqhomboti (traditional beer), cooking meat of 
various descriptions, barbering or hairdressing services, or advertising an 
informal crèche. Even households that do not advertise a service through a 
painted or pencilled sign displayed in a window or pinned on a fence post 
will earn some money looking after neighbours’ children, renting out space 
in fridges or freezers, or offering other, more innovative services, such as 
informal connection to live municipal power lines for residents unable or 
unwilling to pay for their electricity. While, in PLAAS’s 2002 survey, less than 
5% of households reported that they spent time on non-agricultural ‘self-
employed’ activity, in-depth interviews in 2005/06 indicated that the 
majority of households (36 of the 49 households, counting those involved in 
informal agriculture) contained adults who were involved in informal 
economic activity of some kind, albeit sometimes of quite a marginal nature. 
The only households that seemed genuinely devoid of informal economic 
activity were those where either all labour capacity was soaked up by formal 
economic activity or members had recently lost well-paying formal sector 
jobs and were throwing everything into the struggle to regain employment.  
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This is related to the second observation, which is that such informal activity 
is often elusive and hard to pick up in survey interviews. It seems fairly clear 
that the difference between the 2002 survey and the 2005/06 interviews 
cannot be explained by a sudden surge in informal economic activity; some 
of the of the households listed as devoid of informal sector activity in 2002 
were shown in 2005 to have been relying on such activity at the time (Du 
Toit & Neves 2006). Often, the activities discovered by the 2005/06 round of 
interviews surfaced only after some trust had been built up between 
informants and interviewers, or after some probing on the part of the 
interview team (for a discussion of the methodological aspects of this issue, 
see Adato, Lund & Mhlongo 2003). 
 
Thirdly, these activities often seemed simultaneously vital to survival and 
perilously marginal and fragile. In several cases, informants appeared to rely 
heavily for their very survival on economic activities that, even after careful 
probing, seemed to offer only vanishingly small economic rewards: selling a 
few cooked sheep’s heads – which require hours of arduous, dirty and 
unpleasant work – for R10 profit a head; selling, by the cupful, paraffin 
carried kilometres in the hot sun at a profit of a few cents per sale; selling 
individual pieces of chewing gum or single cigarettes or biscuits for 10c each; 
helping run a crèche all day, every day, for a R200 a month; being paid R10 
or R15 for a day’s work plastering a mud hut in the Eastern Cape. All these 
activities seemed barely sustainable or profitable, yet they seemed to be the 
household’s only means of getting their hands on some cash. 
 
The above is worth bearing in mind when considering the nature of much 
writing and research about small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in 
South Africa. Indeed, some of the most important policy treatments of the 
SMME sector suffer from a kind of disjuncture. They often acknowledge the 
diversity of the informal sector, and recognise that by far the greater share 
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of self-employment and informal sector activity is ‘survivalist’ in nature (see, 
for example, Rogerson 1996). However, having done this, many studies 
proceed to concentrate almost entirely on the tiny minority of medium to 
micro enterprises that are not survivalist, that have some potential of 
growing and employing people beside the operator him/herself (see 
Chandra et al. 2001; Berry et al. 2002; Ligthelm 2005). Even studies that are 
explicitly concerned with ‘township businesses’ such as spazas still 
concentrate on those that are large and formal enough to have significant 
credit needs and to be formally plugged into national supply networks 
(Ligthelm 2004). This is understandable; the intellectual frameworks that are 
suitable for understanding micro enterprises have little traction on the 
realities facing those in the so-called survivalist sector.  
 
A good example of what happens when this kind of perspective is used to 
try to assess the nature of informal enterprise and self-employment is 
provided by Gideon Maas and Mike Herrington, authors of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2006 Report for South Africa (Maas & Herrington 
2006). In findings accorded high prominence by South Africa’s business press, 
the report unfavourably compares South Africa’s levels of early-stage 
entrepreneurial activities with international levels and argues that this is 
because South Africans do not have the ‘right mindset’ to be entrepreneurs.3 
Noting that most of those involved in the ‘survivalist’ sector are women, 
Maas & Herringon argue that one important ‘determinant’ which ‘influences 
women entrepreneurs negatively’ is ‘culture/tradition’, which predisposed 
women to ‘look after their families’ and to choose ‘businesses’ that were 
either flexible or undemanding enough to allow this. This, for them, is just 
not good enough; noting that these activities were characterised by the ‘lack 
of the use of new technologies’ and that most of them are what they call 
                                            
3Lack of entrepreneurs spells trouble, iAfrica Business News (14.02.07). Available: 
http://business.iafrica.com/entrepreneurs/628908.htm  
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‘me too’ businesses, they do not pause to consider the constraints and 
conditions that might enforce such characteristics, or how they might be 
adaptive to the realities faced by their protagonists. They observe only that 
it is doubtful whether these types of businesses can really ‘challenge and 
stimulate women to become better entrepreneurs and as such make a better 
contribution to the socio-economic development of the country’ (Maas & 
Herrington 2006: 37) The problem with this kind of analysis is that although 
it tells us a lot about the authors’ assumptions about how a township 
business should look, and about how informal employment activity diverges 
from this ideal type, they fail to consider the particular ways in which these 
activities might be adapted to the realities and challenges faced by their 
protagonists.  
 
In this research project, we did not attempt to assess the profitability or 
sustainability of any ‘informal businesses’ or investigate in depth the micro-
economics of informal economic activity. Such an investigation would 
require a detailed research project in its own right. At the same time, in-
depth interviews produced many insights into the nature of the informal 
economic activities, their place in people’s livelihood strategies, and some of 
the constraints and difficulties that they faced. Here, we highlight other 
crucial features, all of which have profound constraining implications on 
their ability to contribute to livelihoods.  
 
The first is the narrow range, the differential nature, and the concentration 
of benefit for informal economic activities (see Table 4). A very small number 
of households had been involved in some kind of craft production or 
manufacture, or were involved in a fairly lucrative business (a well-
established shebeen, a spaza on a main road, a small builders’ business, and 
two dressmakers). Two households, interestingly, obviously gained 
somewhat from being strategically involved in community work of some 
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kind (this category included a household that ran an independent Zionist 
church, and an individual involved in ‘farming NGOs’ by situating herself as a 
key gatekeeper for development and community outreach work). Most of 
the other activities related either to small-scale retail and low-value services. 
 
 






Number of  
households 
 
Reselling small items (sweets, cigarettes) 7 
Making mud bricks, plastering huts 7 
Preparing and selling food  4 
Domestic work within community 4 
Selling alcohol 4 
Rural services (fixing fences, hoeing fields, herding cattle) 4 
Childcare within community 3 
Running a spaza 2 
Dressmaking 2 
Making reed mats 2 
Traditional healer 2 
Community work 2 
Peddling in commercial centre 1 
Reselling clothes 1 
Transport services 1 
Brewing beer 1 
Running own building business 1 
Grass harvesting 1 
Collecting wood 1 
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The overtraded, overcrowded nature of the sectors populated by ‘survivalist’ 
activities may be due to the relatively low costs of entry to these activities. 
Some of the more remunerative businesses reported by informants required 
the possession of significant levels of skill or some other strategic advantage. 
In both cases where informants were making traditional dresses, for 
instance, this activity required not only sewing skills and a sewing machine, 
but also relied on the ways in which the ‘stretched’ households produced by 
migrancy allowed a kind of spatially distributed production system in which 
rural kin took orders and collected deposits for dresses produced in Cape 
Town. A successful shebeen depended on the infrastructure provided by a 
pick-up truck paid for with formal sector wages and on the social networks 
built over 20 years of local residency. A small building business in the Eastern 
Cape was run from the local headman’s compound. For the rest, the 
activities listed do not require high levels of skill or very extensive capital 
outlay. As Cichello (2005) points out, this means that capital or skill 
thresholds should not count as a major obstacle to self-employment in these 
sectors; but, for exactly that reason, these sectors are also very crowded and 
competitive, which decreases their potential for bringing in significant 
income and makes it quite difficult for them to be viable.  
 
Here, the limitations of an analysis of ‘survivalist’ business that focuses 
mostly on the extent to which they converge with, or diverge from, the 
supposed characteristics of a ‘proper’ formal sector business become 
particularly evident. As we have seen, the marginal and survivalist nature of 
informal economic activity sometimes gives rise to the notion that the 
problem with ‘self-employment’ and ‘micro enterprises’ among poor people 
is that they somehow lack entrepreneurial ability, do not understand 
markets or, as Maas and Herrington (2006) put it, lack the required 
‘mindset’. The problem with this notion is not only in its veiled racism, but 
that it also fails to recognise the significant amount of ingenuity, strategic 
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knowledge and effort that is required to sustain informal economic activity 
under the difficult conditions at the margins of the formal economy.  
 
One important requirement for survival, as we have noted, appears to be a 
willingness to invest huge amounts of labour and time for extremely small 
margins. Another appears to be an ability to negotiate the ‘politics of 
intimacy’ constituted by the complex networks of reciprocation and the 
creation and exchange of obligations, debts and duties within social 
networks. These networks are vital to the systems of ‘private social 
protection’ that allow poor South Africans to mitigate poverty and the 
effects of vulnerability; but they can also be the epicentre of serious conflict, 
tension and highly unequal forms of exchange (Spiegel, Watson & Wilkinson 
1994; Spiegel & Mehlwana 1997; Bracking & Sachikonye 2006; Sagner & Mtati 
1999; Du Toit & Neves 2006). This is a key issue: the viability of businesses did 
not appear to be based simply on their ability to compete on market factors 
like price and quality. Rather than existing in the anonymity of an open 
market where the social relationships between buyers and sellers were 
unimportant, these businesses often had their being entirely within a 
network of acquaintances, household members and kin.  
 
A linked feature of these activities is that very often they are not at all 
clearly distinguished from the domestic economy of the households within 
which they are pursued. Purchases for own consumption and for businesses 
purposes could not be neatly separated, and very often stock bought for the 
purposes of retail would be used to tide over household members during 
difficult periods, or would be subject to competing claims. Were such 
households selling their groceries or eating their stock? The answer 
sometimes seemed to be ‘both’. The lack of distinction between the 
household economy and the ‘business’ should not be seen as evidence that 
informants did not understand ‘business principles’. For one thing, their 
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difficulties in creating a ‘business’ separate from the economy of the 
household stem simply from the harsh realities of poverty. For another, if 
economic shocks or hiatuses sometimes meant that household members ‘ate 
the spaza’ this does not mean their business strategy failed; it simply means 
that utility of informal economic activity should be seen not exclusively in 
terms of its potential to become the seed of a ‘formal’, profitable business, 
but also in the way it allows participants to leverage and supplement scanty 
domestic resources and to cope with shocks.  
 
This is related to a key feature of the ‘survivalist’ informal economic activities 
revealed through research – their supplementary and complementary role 
within a portfolio of other activities to which they were linked in complex 
ways. Most of the informal economic activities in the study were not self-
sustaining, but depended for their continuation on people’s ability to 
leverage one activity through another, or to create complex synergies 
between activities. In some cases, a single person or a single household 
engaged in a wide range of activities that supplemented, complemented 
and fed each other – cash from looking after neighbours’ children or doing 
their washing providing resources to buy stock for the shop. In other cases, 
funds from formal employment or from a social grant supplied the cash that 
enabled informal economic activity to keep going.  
 
What is true ‘inside’ the ‘household’ is also true in relation to the markets in 
which informal economic activity is conducted. This is most obviously true for 
the selling of meat and umqhomboti, which often is conducted very firmly 
within the context of local, face-to-face networks, and is linked to the local 
perceptions of the reputation of particular women and their households 
(Slater 2001). Another important way in which social relationships shape the 
prospects for and conduct of informal economic activities is through the 
dynamics of credit. Here, we are not talking about the need for credit on the 
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part of people involved in informal economic business. Indeed – rather 
surprisingly, given the huge importance accorded to micro-credit by much of 
the literature on informal enterprises – very few informants at all mentioned 
the need for credit as a major constraining factor. Quite often, informants 
did, however, without prompting, mention the difficulties posed by the fact 
that they needed to give credit. In a context where informal economic 
activity is pinned to impoverished areas, and where supermarket chains 
easily ‘suck’ large amounts of money out of the local economy, staying in 
business often depends on one’s willingness to give and recover credit. 
Sustaining informal economic activities, therefore, requires careful and 
astute credit management strategies. This has important implications. Quite 
obviously, this reliance on credit is another factor that means that even for 
very low-level, marginal activities, business is mostly conducted between 
people who know one another. Beyond this, one’s ability to pursue a 
business is also crucially affected by social identity and social relations. For 
example, more than one informant highlighted that gender played a major 
role in one’s ability to collect credit, holding that ‘a man can’t “collect” a 
woman’ or, inversely, that ‘a woman could not “collect” a man’. This has 
important implications, particularly for the ability of single, female 
household heads to participate in informal economic activities. All these 
factors illustrate the importance of understanding in detail the nature of the 
social relationships that constitute the context of informal economic 
activities of whatever kind.  
 
These considerations emphasise the ambiguous and complex implications of 
dependency on social networks for small business activity. To the extent that 
social networks enable people to make strong claims from family or 
household members, it plays a key role both in enabling informal economic 
activity (for example, by allowing pressure on family members to contribute 
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free labour to informal enterprises) and in limiting it (by allowing strong 
claims on the proceeds or even the stock of such ‘businesses’).  
 
It is important that an awareness of these ambiguities does not lead to pat, 
formulaic or reductive analyses. In recent years, some analyses of the risk 
mitigation strategies of poor people have tended to cast these difficult 
compromises as ‘Faustian bargains’, in which long-term prospects are 
sacrificed for short-term security (Wood 2003). Quite aside from the 
availability of such metaphors for appropriation in narratives in which the 
risk-averse poor are blamed for their own poverty, we found little evidence 
for such clear and instrumental trade-offs. We could not find cases in which 
viable paths to long-term wealth had been eschewed through timidity or 
caution. The rather more dispiriting reality seems to be that for many 
informants, social and economic agency as such very often was circumscribed 
and dependent on shifting and perilous foundations. Some – partly because 
of other forms of positional advantage and resource access – can act 
powerfully within their social networks, commanding significant favours and 
driving hard bargains; others transact at a disadvantage, consigned to social 
‘thin ice’ by the vagaries, for example, of social status, age, gender or 
resource access (Du Toit & Neves 2006).  
 
Successful self-employment in Khayelitsha and Mount Frere, then, is not 
simply a function of whether one has ‘the skills’ that are required by ‘the 
First-World economy’; neither is it a matter of a suitable ‘mindset’, or one’s 
‘entrepreneurial ability’ backed up by appropriate sources of micro-credit. 
Ability to participate economically is linked to one’s social positioning in the 
complex networks whereby township and rural society is constituted. Those 
who already have resources, and those who occupy powerful positions 
within their social networks (who, to use current development-speak, have 
more ‘social capital’), are better positioned, and have more heft and 
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leverage in the pursuit informal and formal economic activities than those 
who do not.  
 
 
Unequal contests on a fractured 
terrain: the political economy 
of adverse incorporation 
 
Where does this leave ‘second economy’ talk, and what are the alternatives? 
The point of our arguments so far is not simply that poor people and poor 
areas are linked to the broader economy – that would be conceded readily 
by many who have used the notion of the ‘second economy’. Nor is it simply 
that the wealth of some depends on the poverty of many; although this is 
worth remembering, it is hardly a new observation, and does not require the 
close-grained analysis of livelihood activities. Rather, it is to complicate the 
neat stories and compelling meta-narratives that underpin the apparent self-
evidence of dominant stories about poverty, growth and inequality. 
 
One key aspect of ‘second economy’ discourse is that both the ways in which 
it depicts disconnection and the ways in which it renders integration suffer 
from an underlying functionalism. ‘Integration’ presupposes a rational, 
functional whole in which every part ‘makes sense’ in terms of its 
relationships to all the other parts. Proposing that people should be 
‘integrated’ in the ‘first economy’ imagines that they can find a functional 
place, where their transactions are efficient and optimal to themselves and 
other actors in the ‘system’. That is a highly normative lens through which to 
view the nature of links and connections; in this view, one is either well 
integrated into the system…or not. Problems (such as unequal power 
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relations, or unequal or exploitative exchanges) are imagined simply to be 
imperfections, distortions of a system that in itself, in principle, should work 
to everyone’s advantage. Given the grim conclusions of Banerjee et al. (2006) 
about the capacity of the South African economy to absorb additional 
labour, such assumptions may be ill-founded.  
 
The same functionalism, of course, can be found in reductive explanations 
that simply explain the existence of the ‘margins’ in terms of the 
depredations of a monolithic centre, that are content to point out how the 
economic system produces poverty and marginality, and that see everyone 
‘at the margins’ as being equal victims of unequal power relationships. As 
we have seen, neither Khayelitsha nor Mount Frere is an undifferentiated 
wasteland of ‘surplus people’. Nor are the commanding heights of the 
economy monolithic and simple geographic centres. Although the notions of 
the ‘margins’ and the ‘centre’ might still have some imaginary force, they 
need to be imagined as part of a fractal topography, a shape in which both 
the centre and the margins are everywhere present; and a crucial issue here 
is the highly differentiated nature of social and economic agency 
everywhere on this terrain. Although Grunebaum-Ralph and Henry (2003) 
tend to speak as if the holders of power exist unproblematically in the 
‘centre’, while all the rest are excluded to exist as what Zygmunt Bauman 
(2004) calls ‘human waste’, the reality is that even within the ‘margin’ there 
are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, power-holders and disempowered people (and 
everyone in between).  
 
Is the whole concept of the ‘second economy’, then, to be discarded? How 
else to frame the possibility of systematic structural disjuncture or 
segmentation? One very important aspect of ‘second economy’ discourse – 
and one of the reasons for its powerful hold on our imaginations – lies, as 
pointed out above, in its role as a powerful metaphor. It asks us to imagine 
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the South African economy as a larger, spatially articulated whole, to 
explore the ways in which it might be systematically segmented, and, in 
particular, to consider the ways in which poor people might be 
systematically disadvantaged by how they are inserted into this broader 
economy. In this way, ‘second economy’ talk has a similar potential to that 
of the notion of ‘social exclusion’ (see Du Toit 2004; Hickey & Du Toit 2007). 
The ‘value-added’ of such terms and metaphors arguably lies in their ability 
to focus attention on how particular individuals, groups or livelihoods are 
situated in relation to larger, more complex, spatially and institutionally 
elaborate social and economic formations: countries, markets, economies, 
communities, and so on. 
 
This is an important concern: for although our arguments above tend to 
complicate the simplistic binary oppositions (‘first economy/second 
economy’; ‘well-integrated/disconnected’), our findings do seem to reinforce 
the notion that connections matter. A rural household’s connections with 
the urban outposts are a vital resource, not only because they may be the 
source of remittances, but also because they are vital beachheads in its own 
members’ migrant strategies and their ‘struggle for the cities’ (Mabin 1990). 
Similarly, these connections are crucial to the spatially extended care chains 
that allow urban households to rely on older rural kin for child and sick care, 
that allow ‘distributed’ forms of economic activity, and that support the 
household reproduction and maintenance arrangements, allowing urban 
households to ‘invest back’ into rural homesteads. Again and again, an 
analysis of the configuration of livelihoods and economic activity highlights 
the importance of complex, spatially extended and distributed social and 
institutional frameworks – the ‘many-rooted’ and ‘rhizomic’ structure of 
extended kin networks (Bank, Kamman & Meyer 2006; Du Toit, Skuse & 
Cousins 2007); the social and family associations that allow Pakistani and 
Chinese traders to bring cheap manufactured goods to distant Eastern Cape 
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towns; the roads that either allow easy passage or make distance 
impassable; the complex articulation between the systems of local 
government, delivery, traditional leadership and local elite networks; and, 
crucially, the complex institutional architecture of the monetised South 
African economy (the electric grid, cellphone telephony, supermarket 
distribution systems, complex and vertically integrated commodity chains, 
the cash economy itself!). All these phenomena, at one level completely 
diverse, are also and importantly elaborate spatial connective frameworks 
that play a key role in the process of social ordering, and confer advantage 
and disadvantage in highly differential and uneven ways.4  
 
Such an analysis allows us to focus more clearly on the nodes everywhere in 
society where power and advantage congeal, and aids us in exploring the 
factors that allocate people their positionality in these networks. In such a 
framework, the key issue is not whether or not people are connected, but 
the always complex consequences of particular forms of integration. 
Supermarkets and roads can bring cheaper food, but they can also eviscerate 
local agrarian systems. Migrancy can be of benefit, but if some rural 
households benefit from migration, rural prices can rise even for those who 
have not benefited (Bracking & Sachikonye 2006). Connections between 
urban and rural kin can bring access to resources and can cushion shocks, 
but, by that very token, they are the conduit for counter-claims and the 
transmission of shocks as well.  
 
                                            
4 This is related to a theoretical issue: the social and economic agency of any individual person, and 
their ability to benefit from that agency is mediated and shaped, not only by the particular resources 
upon which they can draw (the familiar ‘capitals’ or ‘assets’ of the ‘livelihood framework’ that 
dominates much of development research), but also by their positionality in respect of these larger, 
spatially articulated formations: their relationship to the circuits and connections through which 
resources and burdens, ‘shocks’ and windfalls are transmitted across space, and their access to what 
we might call social technologies of spatialised power. These constitute the ‘actant networks’, as actor 
network theory puts it, that allow particular people to ‘act at a distance’, to make their influence felt 
in distant places, transmitting the effects of far-off events and processes into local contexts.  
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What is revealed is not a vision of an economy that is comprised out of two 
distinct and disconnected realms, nor is it the simple contrast between the 
powerful urban centres and their scrap heaps of discarded human lives. 
Rather, what emerges is the messy map of unequally constituted, 
differentially positioned and closely related spaces described by James 
Ferguson (2006) in his analysis of the spatial and institutional workings of 
‘globalisation’: enclaves of power and peripheralised zones; circuits, routes 
and ‘wormholes’ that connect distant realms in surprisingly direct ways; 
spatial traps and buffer zones; rural outposts; and urban beachheads. 
Even more crucially, this is not a realm of ‘mere complexity’. If power and 
advantage congeal, they congeal in systematic ways. Race and class may not 
intersect exactly as they have done in the past (Seekings & Nattrass 2005) 
but, for many, the persistence of deeply embedded racialised and gendered 
power relations and accumulated socio-economic disadvantage interact with 
the processes of globalisation and post-industrial economic growth to create 
deep structural obstacles to economic and social agency within a system on 
which they are thoroughly dependent. That is one of the reasons for 
proposing the notion of ‘adverse incorporation’ as a key theme in the study 
of persistent poverty. If policy-making and enquiry need a simplifying lens or 
a guiding metaphor, we may do well to replace the narratives of mere 
‘exclusion’ with the notion that poverty persists also because of the 
disadvantageous ways in which people are incorporated into economic and 
social life; and that rather than merely trumpeting integration, policy-
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Conclusion: what is found there 
 
How does this help in policy terms? It would be arrogant and presumptuous 
to spell out a whole alternative package of measures that, should the 
government only implement them, would do away with persistent poverty. 
That requires detailed policy work and thought in its own right. As a 
beginning, however, a valuable start might be made by trying to liberate 
analysis from the teleological, evolutionary assumptions that assume that 
what exists in the ‘Third World’ economy needs to be understood 
normatively through the lens of how it falls short of the ‘First’ – an approach 
to life at the margins of the formal economy that fails to see how the 
livelihood strategies that are found there are appropriate adaptations to the 
realities of the terrain on which the poor survive, and that can only 
positively value those aspects of self-employment that can be read as being, 
at least in principle, ‘proper’ Western-style businesses.  
 
If this does not sound like an important issue, consider the announcement, 
in February 2006, by Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka, of an 
initiative called the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (ASGISA) – a strategy in which the government carved out a much 
more clearly developmental role for the South African state – aiming to 
halve poverty by 2014 (RSA 2006). A significant number of the measures 
proposed in this document were initiatives aimed primarily at reducing the 
cost of business in the ‘mainstream’ economy, but an important section of 
the document also announced a grab-bag of initiatives aimed at ‘eliminating 
the second economy’. Most prominent among these was the proposal to 
leverage increased levels of public expenditure to develop small business, 
apparently by relying on preferential procurement, access to finance, and a 
review of regulations, making use of the business opportunities offered by 
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the 2010 World Cup. Other initiatives had a distinctly De Sotoan flavour, such 
as the proposal that the government would realise the value of ‘dead assets’ 
through accelerating the formalisation of land tenure and the 
implementation of the financial services charter. Subsequently, a detailed 
programme of action has been developed by ASGISA (Mlambo-Ngcuka 
2006), including an initiative called ‘Jobs for Growth’, situated in the 
Department of Trade and Industry, which reportedly aims to create one 
million jobs in 300 000 small enterprises and co-operatives in the rural areas 
in the next five years, a programme that is apparently to be modelled on the 
Israeli Kibbutz experience (NatGrowth 2007).  
 
While undoubtedly some of these initiatives are laudable – prioritising 
training and supporting small businesses are clearly useful things to do – 
what is immediately striking is that most of these initiatives are open to the 
very same charge formulated by President Mbeki in his own critique of the 
limitations of classic trickle-down: although they purportedly are focused on 
the ‘second economy’, it is hard to see how they can be of benefit to any of 
the ‘survivalist’ businesses described here. Like so much of SMME policy, 
many of the proposals lack any kind of traction on the difficult realities 
faced by those at the margins of the formal economy, and appear to be 
aimed at ‘businesses’ and ‘enterprises’ that are already much more 
advantageously positioned. Other ideas – like the bizarre notion that one 
million jobs can be created inter alia through supporting Israeli-style co-
operatives in the rural areas – seem founded on a distinct misunderstanding 
of the history of the heavily subsidised kibbutz movement and a failure to 
grapple with local structural conditions in which South African co-ops would 
have to survive. In addition, although existing tenure arrangements in the 
communal areas do render many people subject to the authority of local 
gatekeepers, it is unclear whether a De Sotoan package of tenure 
formalisation would ‘unlock’ much ‘dead value’ at all (Cousins et al. 2005).  




These conclusions are relevant not only to South Africa. In this paper, we 
have shown that a close analysis of the real social and power relations that 
enable or undermine economic activity at the margins of the formal 
economy give the lie to naïve or totalising narratives that see poverty as 
residual, as the ‘remainder’ left over by ‘not enough growth’, and that 
assume that this can be addressed through the modernising magic wrought 
by better integration with the mainstream economy. Clearly, some do 
benefit from such integration; but others do not, and policy has to be based 
on a realistic assessment of the ways in which the normal operation of 
markets in the mainstream economy can increase inequality and exacerbate 
vulnerability. This should be enough to raise real questions about the meta-
narratives of modernisation and capitalist integration that inform initiatives 
like NEPAD, or simplistic assumptions about the links between globalisation 
and growth in ‘developing countries’. 
 
Rather than aiming to ‘eliminate’ the ‘second economy’ or hoping that it can 
somehow be transfigured into the ‘first’, policy-makers would do better to 
look carefully at measures that can ameliorate existing power imbalances 
and reduce inequality. Looking at ‘what is found there’ with a less 
pathologising, less normative gaze, abandoning the naïve belief that 
‘integration’ on its own will confer the benefits of modernity on those who 
unaccountably remain outside, and looking at the exclusionary implications 
of mainstream corporate practice in South Africa may help in crafting 
policies that are better at addressing the adverse nature of some of the 
power relations between poor South Africans and the larger economic 
formations to which they are connected, policies which value and support 
the fragile survival strategies that take shape on this hostile and difficult 
terrain. 
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